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Increases in OHR's Responsibilities Since October 1961

1. During the period since October 1961 there has been a significant re-allocation and a noticeable intensification of OHR's research effort in order to accommodate the growing demands for support of policy and action officials and the changing focus and scope of priorities imposed by major consumers of our intelligence products.

2. A number of these adjustments are reflected by the following changes in OHR's economic research effort:

a. In its research on military-economic activities of the Sino-Soviet Bloc the Office now covers in depth a number of subjects that either were not studied prior to October 1961 or were covered on a minimum basis. We are now, for example, making substantial contributions to studies of Soviet military programming and Soviet military thought. Research on Soviet deployment of major weapons systems, shorter range missiles and missile activities in countries of the Bloc other than the USSR has increased sharply and increased attention has been given to Soviet space activities. Support for disarmament planning, which had been relatively small, has mushroomed largely as a result of requests from the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. Increasing intelligence assistance also is being provided to the recently formed CIA/DIA group which is examining a series of alternative Soviet force postures for the period 1967-1972. This involves, among other tasks, the costing of these alternative force postures. The Cuban situation, of course, required a substantial diversion of personnel resources and, even though there has been some moderation of this crisis, Soviet military-economic activity in this area continues to receive close attention. In order to concentrate all of OHR's research on the Bloc military effort in one component, the Military-Economic Division was formed in May 1962. This Division is currently recognized as the principal source of intelligence within the Government on Soviet Bloc missile production and deployment.

b. OHR's responsibilities related to the international economic activities of the Bloc have increased greatly. In order to carry out the research effort in this field more effectively a new International Division was formed in OHR

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in May 1962. New regional branches were established in this Division to study Soviet penetration activities and their impact in underdeveloped areas of the Free World. Another branch was set up to analyze the institutional arrangements within the Sino-Soviet Bloc for developing personnel, policies, and programs for the conduct of Bloc foreign assistance, and for the training of Free World students within Communist countries. More recently ORR has increased the number of analysts working on Soviet military assistance in order to cover the expanding activities in this field and to meet the increasing number of requests for intelligence on this subject. Over the past year or so the Bloc continued to augment its foreign economic and military activity in Cuba, prompting an intensified research effort by this Office not only on Bloc deliveries but on technical and military assistance and on the shipping associated with these activities as well.

c. The Office has been called upon to provide an increasing number of intelligence reports on the internal economies of Communist Yugoslavia and Cuba -- countries which previously had occupied very little of ORR's research time. This change was required not only to support policy officials

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Beyond this, the Office has undertaken new responsibilities for the production of economic research papers on the economies of selected non-Communist countries. These studies have been centered in the newly-established regional branches of the International Division and have focused on countries facing the threat of Communist penetration such as India and Brazil whose economic problems are sufficiently complex and important to our security to warrant economic intelligence analysis. This support has taken the form of contributions to National Estimates on Free World countries and various ad hoc reports prepared in response to requests on such subjects as the impact of the Sino-Indian border conflict on India's economy. While the overall analysis of these economies is carried on within the International Division, the Manufacturing and Services and the Resources Divisions also have shifted a growing percentage of their work to Free World economies, both in support of broad studies of these economies and in more narrowly focused research on particular economic sectors of priority importance. These have included, for example, reports on the threat of sabotage to the metals industries of Katanga and on the logistical capabilities of Communist China in the conflict with India.

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d. Still another area of increased responsibility for ORR has been in support of current intelligence. Steadily increasing demands for more reports on current economic situations, which reached a crescendo during the Cuban crisis, have resulted in a doubling in economic intelligence support to current intelligence from 7 percent of total research time during the last half of 1961 to 15 percent of total research time during the last half of 1962. In addition to the support of current intelligence as such, there has been a notable upsurge over the past 15 months in the publication of memoranda and reports on topics of current importance to various policy officials and to DD/P.

3. In the Geographic Research Area of ORR a number of shifts in emphasis have occurred as a result of consumer requirements:

a. Support to operational planning of the Clandestine Services and the Special Group (CI) increased markedly and currently absorbs a fairly high percentage of research time devoted to the Far East, Latin America, and Near East/Africa. Similarly, cartographic support has been shifted more toward direct operational support.

b. Work on the joint CIA/AMS program for extensive and detailed mapping of the USSR has expanded considerably in the last fifteen months. As a reference aid the maps produced under this program have already proved useful for a variety of purposes.

c. In support of geodetic intelligence needs the man-hours assigned to the collation of information on Soviet personnel, organizations, and activities associated with Soviet geodesy and gravimetry have been increased somewhat since October 1961. While the number of manhours involved is small compared to other geographic research this effort is making a significant intelligence contribution.

d. The program for providing Geographic Intelligence Memoranda that cover areas of current or potential concern was further intensified as a result of world events and the demonstrated utility of this background support. Ten such memoranda, more than twice the number of any previous year, were prepared, covering such topics as the Sino-Indian Border; Air and Surface Access Routes to Berlin; and the Disputed Frontiers of Kashmir.

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e. Cartographic assistance was continued to various components of the Agency and the Department of State with an increase in support for OSI of over 60 percent and for ONE of over 30 percent. The Special Support Branch of Cartography Division has been enlarged by 20 percent to meet minimum requirements for cartographic work in the Special Center.

f. The collection effort of the Map Library has shifted somewhat toward certain of those non-Bloc countries which appear to be early targets for Communist expansionist ambitions. The reference and library support function of the Map Library was complicated by the inability to move the Map Library to Langley and, in order to provide minimum service, two small "beach heads" were established at Langley and in the Department of State.

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In early 1962 OHR's Intelligence Information Staff, with contributions from other elements of the Agency and the Intelligence Community, produced a USIB Cuban Interrogation Guide. This guide is used by all information collectors who have assets or potential assets for the collection of information concerning Cuba. Periodic revisions of the guide have been made to insure that requirements are current and relevant to USIB information needs. The production and maintenance of this guide demand considerable extra time and effort on the part of the Intelligence Information Staff.

During 1962, changes in emphasis in OHR's research and the widening scope of subject and area coverage resulted in increasing demands on the OHR Reading Panel. Receipt of information reports for the last six months of 1962 represented a 75% increase over the preceding six months, but there was some decrease in numbers of other types of reports received. This increase in documents received,

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scanned, and routed also caused a corresponding increase in workload for mail handling and courier services. Although these increased demands for service have strained our facilities, these functions are being maintained without additional personnel.

5. During the past 15 months the work of the Assistant for Special Projects (including his function as Chairman of the COMOR Targeting Working Group) has increased markedly for the following reasons:

a. The geographical scope of the work has expanded beyond the USSR and Eastern Europe to include numerous countries not previously covered.

b. New technological developments have necessitated a refinement of the work with a commensurate increase in the amount of time required to complete assignments.

c. The staff recently has been delegated the responsibility for interagency coordination of requirements for a sensitive collection effort in the field of electronic intelligence.

This work, of course, is in support of the entire community's program in this field. The manpower required for this added work amounts to at least five man-years and relief by augmentation of staff is essential.

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Rough Approximation of Personnel Required in OHR
To Carry out Additional Responsibilities
 (in man-year equivalents)


We have approximated below the number of personnel (in man-year equivalents) required to carry out the increased responsibilities assigned to OHR since October 1961. In the intervening period there was no increase in the authorized strength of the Office and, in order to pick up these added functions without any T/O increase, it was necessary to make the following adjustments:

- a. Cut back work of lower priority.
- b. Shift to high priority tasks personnel previously applied to work of lower and equivalent priority -- work which can now be done more efficiently by reason of more trained and experienced personnel and because of the growing background of research.
- c. Increase overtime work (recorded and unrecorded)

The following figures are designed merely to indicate in gross orders of magnitude the increased workload carried out by this Office and the size of the personnel readjustments which have occurred. It should be emphasized, however, that these shifts have not been sufficient to accommodate completely the added responsibilities which have been imposed on the Office during the last 15 months. Some work of importance has not even been initiated and some papers have not received the care and attention they deserve.

Economic Research Area

Military-Economic Research	8-10
Research on Bloc organizations, activities and programs related to economic and military penetration of underdeveloped countries; and research on selected Free World areas plus Cuba	28-30

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Current Intelligence and Policy Support (includes consideration of time expended on contributions from all ERA Divisions)	10-15*
<u>Geographic Research Area</u>	
CIA/AMS Mapping Project	6
Support for Clandestine Services and Special Group (CI)	9
Geographic Intelligence Memoranda; Support to OHR; and Policy Support	2
<u>Intelligence Information Staff</u> (Cuban Requirements Guide and Information Processing)	2
<u>Assistant for Special Projects</u>	<u>5</u>
Total	<u>70-80</u>

* Current Intelligence is judged to take about 15 percent of total research time; however, the figures in this table were calculated as a smaller percentage to take account of some overlap with increases specified above in other categories.

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